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The rise of insecure Internet of Things (IoT) on the Internet is problematic because 
they are easily compromised. IoT vendors are trying to push products to market as quickly 
as possible resulting in a significant amount of security issues. This work explores the 
attacks vectors used by malware to gain privilege control of IoT devices. We achieve this 
by performing two experiments – a static binary analysis that checks for specific patterns 
and identifies a binary to a publicly disclosed vulnerability, and a dynamic binary analysis 
focusing on linking program behavior to malicious actions. We further extend upon this by 
analyzing ELF section metadata of “tagged” binaries to determine if we can link specific 
ELF section sizes and entropies to malicious binaries. Through our work, we see that a 
large portion of vulnerabilities occurs due to improperly validated inputs, followed by weak 
credentials and improperly secured files. Moreover, we have also found that we are unable 
to link ELF section metadata to malicious binaries, as a result of anti-analysis efforts by 
malware authors. Our intention with this work is to understand how malware attacks IoT 







CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Between 2016 and 2018, household Internet of Things (IoT device, e.g. smart 
fridges, Google Home) adoption rate rose 48%, from 4.7 billion devices to 7.0 billion 
devices connected to the Internet globally [1,2].  The residential IoT market has recently 
established itself as a multi-billion-dollar industry [3], evolving into an extremely lucrative 
field for both new and established companies. With an influx of new IoT products being 
created to keep up with the market demand, IoT software security has largely been 
overlooked. This has left consumers compromised to attacks such as botnet opt-in [4], man-
in-the-middle attacks [5], and illicit surveillance [6]. 
Ample studies exist on the topic of IoT malware and cover many methodologies 
from how to secure deployed IoT devices on a local network [7] to how to analyze IoT 
devices for security research purposes [8]. These studies focus on securing and isolating a 
network with IoT devices from external attackers. However, with new and evolving threats 
arising as a result of global device adoption, it can be difficult to adapt to attacks without 
knowing attack vectors. By knowing current attack vectors, vendors and developers will 
be able to prioritize what to protect in developing IoT devices. 
In this study, we present our methodology in analyzing IoT Malware to determine 
current attack vectors, utilizing static and dynamic binary analysis techniques to discover 
and characterize possible malicious behavior of a binary. We make use of malware tagging 
using Yara signatures to scan a binary for specific patterns linked to publicly disclosed 
vulnerabilities, as well as make use of strace to capture and summarize a binary’s behavior. 
Moreover, we make use of Python modules Lief to analyze ELF section metadata to 
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determine if it is possible to link specific metadata values to malicious binaries.  Through 
our work, we were able to identify the attack vectors of 8410 out of 42327 binaries relating 
to 56 publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. Moreover, we were also able to determine that 
correlation between ELF section metadata and malicious binaries is not possible.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Current research around malware in IoT devices primarily revolves around two 
fields – security framework analysis and security standard proposals. For security 
framework analysis, research primarily focuses on methods to secure and isolate IoT 
devices at a network level to prevent malware infection and/or propagation within large-
scale systems. Meanwhile, security standard proposals focus on advocating for a software 
and hardware policy that will be globally implemented and “impenetrable.”  
 Riahi, A., et. al [7] proposed a method in theoretically securing an IoT device within 
a network or ecosystem with user-centrical security analysis, focusing on a user’s 
interaction with an IoT device. This paper, more importantly, sets out a single framework 
to analyze malware with its “tension-recommendation” model. In this model, a researcher 
determines possible faults of the security (the tension) and any adjustments that can be 
made to prevent any security problems (the recommendation). In a more technically-driven 
analysis, Mare, S., et. al [9] evaluates seven popular IoT devices and assesses each device 
based on security within access control, privacy, automation, and interoperability. The 
Mare paper also makes use of this “tension-recommendation” model but extends this model 
to cater to specific devices and technical methods. However, researchers cannot find 
common ground on specific IoT security problems. For example, the Mare paper 
recommends that to maintain privacy within an IoT device a device must reduce leaks from 
side-channels – functions that are not core to the IoT device. However, Sivaraman, V., et 
al. [10] instead recommends using an SMP protocol to prevent any data leaks of any private 
data. More recently, researchers have released Proof of Concepts to supplement their 
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research of framework analysis, for example in the papers of Alrawi, O., et al. [8] and 
Fernandes, E., et al. [11]. With no common ground, research can only go so far as to be 
“soft recommendations” within the IoT field. As the malware landscape continues to 
evolve, papers and frameworks such as these can quickly become obsolete. 
 More recently, to achieve consistency between IoT platforms, researchers have 
begun to propose standards for security frameworks, as opposed to adding on to pre-
existing proprietary IoT platforms. For example, Lake, D., et al.’s study [12] proposes an 
architectural security framework standard for IoT devices within the eHealth field. The 
paper recommends building a framework based on a singular “building block stack,” so 
that when a security issue arises within an eHealth device, the problem area can easily be 
pinpointed and fixed. This prevents any issue with vendors having to work through 
proprietary frameworks to mitigate a problem. While this is very much a valid solution, the 
main issue that hampers its implementation is the difficulty of collectively agreeing upon 
a standard. Two papers that demonstrate this are Goutam, S., W. Enck, and B. Reaves, [13] 
and OConnor, T., et al. [14]. The Goutam-Enck-Reaves paper proposes “Hestia” – a 
security standard primarily focused on simple isolation policies where controllers (such as 
Smart Hubs) are only connected to the global network and non-controllers (such as Hue 
Light bulbs) are only connected to controllers. Meanwhile, the OConnor paper proposes 
“HomeSnitch” – a security standard that separates an IoT device’s core functionality from 
its semantic behavior, hardening security on specific behavioral traits rather than the 
products itself. However, almost ironically, these two papers presenting different standards 
for IoT security were presented at the same conference. This demonstrates that in creating 
a standard for security in a billion-dollar market, no one can agree on a specific standard. 
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 For our work, we decided to step away from higher-level security analysis and 
instead look at vectors currently used to attack and infect IoT devices. Our reasoning 
behind identifying attack vectors is to look at network IoT security at a device level rather 
than at a holistic network level. By looking at attack vectors within the IoT device, we can 
complement current security research in IoT and leverage traditional security defense 
ecosystems to assist vendors in proactively protecting devices from attackers.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
In the analysis of embedded Linux binaries, there are two significant analysis 
methods we considered in determining how a malicious Linux program infects and 
compromises IoT devices. These techniques are Static Binary Analysis and Dynamic 
Binary Analysis. We extend upon these by analyzing ELF Section Metadata to determine 
if there is any correlation between malicious binaries and ELF section metadata. 
3.1 Static Binary Analysis 
 The primary purpose of conducting static binary analysis is to determine what 
infection vectors Linux binary uses to infect an IoT device. Static binary analysis made use 
of Yara signatures to identify if a binary uses a known vulnerability for infection. Yara is 
a program that takes in signatures (metadata files that contain a tag that is paired to a 
matchable hex or string pattern) and analyzes a set of binary samples matching a binary to 
a specific tag. 
3.1.1 Infection Detection  
There are two main ways that we produced signatures to tag binaries in Yara: 
manual generation with addition verification vetting (sourced from NVD and Routersploit) 




3.1.1.1 Manual Generation – Sourcing from NVD  
To create our Yara Signatures, we first compiled a list of vendors that produced 
IoT devices. This vendor list comprised both of companies that specialize in (such as 
Lutron,) as well as larger technology companies which produce IoT devices as part of their 
product portfolio (e.g. Google, Amazon, etc.)  
 Once this list of vendors was compiled, we scraped all CVEs whose vulnerable 
product was produced by a company in our vendor list. To do this, we downloaded the 
JSON-formatted data feeds from 2002 to 2019 from the National Vulnerability Database 
of CVEs [15]. We then went through every CVE entry and looked at the Common Platform 
Enumeration v2.3 Uri (cpi23Uri) string for each product vulnerable to the specific CVE. If 
the fourth field of the cpi23Uri string (corresponding to a vendor) contained our target 
vendor, we placed the CVE in our database.  
After compiling the list of all the CVEs that correspond to our vendor list, we 
filtered out all CVEs that did not apply to IoT or networking based devices. Since our list 
of vendors consisted of larger companies that produce non-IoT and non-networking 
products, we had to remove all CVEs that were associated with irrelevant software and 
hardware. To do this, we compiled a list of products grouped by vendor by iterating through 
the aforementioned CVE data feeds and associated cpi23Uri strings. We then scraped the 
fifth field of each cpi23Uri string corresponding to the vulnerable product, grouping the 
product with the previously retrieved vendor. Once this list of products was compiled, we 
manually looked through the list of products to determine which products were relevant 
for our research, removing non-IoT and non-networking products from our list. With this 
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final list of relevant products, we iterate through the data feed again to retrieve a list of 
CVEs that pertain to IoT products. 
To further filter out what CVEs we can write Yara signatures for, we iterated 
through the data feeds one last time to compile a list of CVEs with its associated Proof of 
Concept (PoC) exploit code. To retrieve the PoC code, for each CVE in the data feed we 
check if there is an exploit-db.com link within the “references” field. If there is, we access 
the link and scraped the PoC exploit code from the website source code. If the CVE does 
not have PoC exploit code or an exploit-db.com link within its references, we remove it 
from our list of CVEs. 
To write our Yara signatures, we looked at each PoC exploit code to determine if a 
unique and discernable pattern existed that could link a binary to a specific CVE. If a CVE 
did not have a unique and discernable pattern, such as that in Denial of Service and Buffer 
Overflow vulnerabilities, we removed it from our list of CVEs. We then wrote our Yara 
signature in the Yara file format 
From our first-generation process, we scraped 365 PoC exploit codes, which we 
filtered down to create 69 YARA signatures.  
3.1.1.2 Manual Generation – Sourcing from Routersploit  
 To generate Yara signatures from Routersploit modules, we first pulled a list of 
exploits from the Routersploit GitHub repo [16]. When looking at each module, we see 
that each PoC exploit code is provided to us as python code.  For each PoC python script, 
we looked through the code to determine if there was a unique string or a group of unique 
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strings that could be linked to a specific Routersploit vulnerability (determining string 
uniqueness is outlined in 3.1.1.1) 
 If it is possible to write a Yara signature, we manually write the Yara signature in 
the Yara file format using the unique group of strings. Otherwise, we do not include the 
Routersploit module in our database of Yara signatures. Through this process, we wrote 
113 signatures. 
3.1.1.3 Automatic Generation – Sourcing from Alienvault’s OSSim Emerging Rules 
 Alienvault’s OSSim is a security information and event management (SIEM) 
system that, when given a set of rules, can detect, filter and block network traffic in real-
time. In this section, we are automatically generating Yara signatures given a set of OSSim 
rules pertaining to network devices. 
 To automatically convert an OSSim rule to a Yara Signature, we first looked at the 
structure of an OSSim rule. Through analysis, we see that a rule is in the following 
structure: 
alert [protocol] [source IP]->[dest IP] (msg:”[tag]”; content:”[signature]”; 
content:”[signature]; …) 
For our research, the most interesting fields and contents for us were the “msg” 
field and “content” fields of the rule, corresponding to the tag and the signature of the rule. 
In generating our Yara signature, we made use of these fields to write our signature in the 
Yara file format. 
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One quirk of an OSSim rule that is not present in YARA signatures is that the 
“content” of the rule mixes hex values and ASCII characters, switching between the two 
with the pipe (|) character. Such is the case in the rule "ET EXPLOIT Pwdump3e 
pwservice.exe Access port 445," which has the content of 
"p|00|w|00|s|00|e|00|r|00|v|00|i|00|c|00|e|00|.|00|e|00|x|00|e.” As observed, this is just the 
string “pwservice.exe” in wide-character format. Since this cannot be done in a Yara 
signature, we had to convert all ASCII characters of these “mixed strings” into hex values 
before writing the Yara signature. 
For our research, we performed the automatic generation of Yara signature on a 
database of router rules called “emerging-exploit,” [17] gathering 254 automatically-
generated Yara-signatures 
3.1.2 Signature Evaluation 
Before running the Yara signatures to collect data, we verified correctness by 
running our signatures on a set of 42,327 malicious binaries. These malicious binaries were 
sourced from Virus Total. 
To verify these Yara signatures, we first wrote a “master” Yara signature that made 
use of Yara’s “include” syntax to combine all the Yara signatures into a single file [18]. 
Using this master rule, we then made use of Yara to scan and tag every binary, piping 
output into a text file. Scanning 42,327 binaries with 436 Yara signatures took 
approximately 45 seconds to complete. 
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Once we were able to tag every binary, we counted how many times each signature 
was tagged. We sorted these signature occurrences to gather a general distribution to 
determine what signatures may be false positives and what signatures were true positives. 
Looking at our signature occurrence counts, we flagged any signatures that were tagged 
more than 10000 times and any signature that was tagged less than 100 times. The reason 
why these thresholds were chosen was that if the signature’s detection pattern is too 
simplistic, it would tag an unusually large amount or an unusually small amount of times. 
Out of 436 signatures, we flagged 232 signatures for manual verification 
After the flagging process, we looked at all the flagged signatures to determine if 
the signatures were valid enough to be used for static analysis. If we found that a signature 
was too simple (ie, a two-byte pattern – one that was automatically generated) we would 
remove the Yara signature from our database. Otherwise, if the signature was specific but 
tagging unusually high or unusually low, we looked at the binary using NSA’s Ghidra to 
determine if the detection patterns are being correctly utilized to detect the proper 
vulnerability. We made use of Ghidra’s powerful disassembler, tracing tool, and hex search 
to trace the string pattern to the pattern’s usage in code. If we found that the provided 
detection patterns are being used to detect and exploit the vulnerability, we keep the Yara 
signature within our database. Otherwise, we remove the signature from our database. 
Once we completed this manual verification process, we were confident in moving 
forward in using the signatures to detect vulnerabilities. After this process, from a total of 
436 signatures, we moved forward with 209 signatures to detect vulnerabilities exploited 
within binaries. 
 12 
To run Yara, we re-built another master signature comprising of “imports” of our 
209 signatures that were validated to detect vulnerabilities. Using this master signature, we 
proceeded to run Yara against our set of malicious binaries to tag binaries with specific 
Yara signatures. Again, we count how many times a signature was tagged. 
Once we completed the tagging and counting of Yara signatures, we grouped the 
tagged signatures into four distinct infection vector groups: remote code execution, 
privilege escalation, information leaks, and miscellaneous. After grouping, we arrive at the 
table of results present in section 4.2. 
3.2 Dynamic Binary Analysis 
 The primary purpose of conducting dynamic binary analysis is to determine the 
behavior of a Linux binary and verify the infection technique. A dynamic binary analysis 
provides us with observed scanning and exploitation and can be utilized to validate the 
attack vectors and methods based on commonly detected behavioral patterns. Currently, 
dynamic binary analysis efforts are incomplete but will be utilized as a black box to verify 
the infection technique. 
3.2.1 System Call Tracing 
 To conduct a dynamic binary analysis on a binary, we run strace on the malicious 
binary to capture a program’s behavior. To run strace with a target binary, we first 
determine what architecture the binary using Linux’s file. Once we know the architecture 
of the file, we use qemu to emulate processor architecture and run strace with the binary 
 13 
file. We capture the output of strace and use this system call trace for further summarization 
and analysis. 
 On occasion, binaries may run in an infinite loop, whether to look for targets to 
propagate to, perform attacks once given a “kill switch.” To prevent an infinitely large 
output file size, we limit strace captures to 10 minutes. If a program were to run for 10 
minutes, we kill the program. 
3.2.2 Trace Classification 
 Before summarizing system call traces, we first group all possible system calls into 
six distinct categories: File, Network, Process, Memory, Environment, and Other. To do 
this, we manually go through all system calls present in Linux’s man pages [19] and read 
each description, allocating each system call into a category that fits its function. 
Once we group every system call into the 6 categories, we proceed to clean up and 
summarize system call traces. To clean up a system call trace, we split each system call 
within the trace into four distinct sections – the function name, list of arguments, and return 
value, and time after the program was run (in milliseconds) outputting the data to a JSON 
format. The clean system call traces were then summarized by counting the system call 
category occurrences within the program. 
3.2.3 OS Object Behavior Modeling 
 We further extend our system call summarizing by building an OS object 
dependency graph. First, we manually looked through all system calls again on Linux man 
pages to record which system calls either created a file descriptor or uses a file descriptor 
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within the arguments. In this process, we record what the file descriptor created is, as well 
as the function’s file descriptor argument number. 
 We then iterate through all the clean system calls traces to link an OS object/file 
descriptor to the function that created it, as well as the functions that use it. Given these 
sets of functions linked to an OS object, we group and count categories of system calls per 
OS object to create a category summary per file descriptor. 
3.3 Metadata Analysis 
 We extend upon our positive binary dataset by plotting ELF section metadata to 
determine whether it is possible to identify a malicious binary based on a binary’s section 
metadata. In this section, we are recording the count, size, and entropy of ELF sections and 
graphing this data as a cumulative distribution function. We perform this analysis to 
determine if there is any correlation between ELF section metadata and malicious binaries. 
 Once we complete malicious binary identification (as per section 3.1), we compile 
two lists: a list of binaries that were tagged as “positive” by Yara (the “hit” group) and a 
list of all binaries in the malware corpus (the “all” group.)  Per binary and group, we use 
the python tool Lief [20] to collate the number of sections in a binary and the size and 
entropy of each section in the binary. At the end of this collation, we end up with two data 
sets per group: the number of sections in each binary, and the size and entropy of each ELF 
section per binary. We proceed to group the latter data set by the ELF section and culminate 
a list of all sizes and entropies matching the requested ELF section.  
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 From these data sets, we proceed to filter out ELF sections that will not provide 
conclusive data. We do this by looking at the ELF section data set of the “hit” group and 
removing any ELF section and respective metadata that has less than 10 appearances in the 
hit group. By doing this, we filtered our ELF section analysis space from 107 sections to 
64 sections. 
 Upon filtering our sections, we plot cumulative distribution functions (CFs) of all 
of our data sets. With our data sets, we produced three CDF plots per group: a CDF plot of 
section counts, a CDF plot of section sizes per ELF section, and a CDF plot of section 
entropies per ELF section. In the end, we graphed 52 sections for a total of 208 CDF graphs. 
Including the two CDF graphs of section counts, we compiled 210 CDF graphs of ELF 
section metadata. 
3.4 Technical Challenges 
 Most of the challenges that occurred in the analysis process surrounded creating 
high-quality YARA signatures for static binary analysis. As it is difficult to automatically 
derive usable signatures, we had to manually generate our signatures to ensure correctness. 
 Our first challenge was in filtering CVEs before manually writing a YARA signature. 
Since most vendors are not IoT specific, once we collated our list of CVEs linked to each 
vendor, we had to look at what device each CVE is linked to and remove CVEs which are 
linked to non-IoT related devices. 
After this first filtering process, we then looked at the exploit source code of the CVE 
to determine if we can write a YARA signature based on unique patterns present in the 
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source code. If the CVE did not have a provided exploit source code, or there were no 
unique and specific patterns that could be used to tag a binary to a specific CVE, we 
removed that CVE from our list. 
Our second challenge arose once we built our database of YARA signatures. As we 
automated the writing of 58% of YARA signatures, it was necessary to test for false 
positives to get completely correct data. To do this, we ran all YARA signatures against 
our sample set of 42,327 binaries, counting how many times each signature was found. 
Once we collated a list of signatures and their “found” counts, we look at which signatures 
had an unusually high or unusually low “found” count, tagging such signatures as 
“suspicious.” 
Amongst all these “suspicious” signatures, we first looked at the criteria patterns to 
determine if they were specific enough to be used to tag a binary. If the criteria patterns 
were too simple, we would remove that signature from our database. However, if the 
criteria patterns looked specific, we analyzed binaries that were tagged with that signature 
using the Ghidra disassembler to determine whether or not the criteria patterns were valid 
indicators of the vulnerability. If the binary did use the criteria patterns to exploit the 
vulnerability, the signature was kept in the database. Otherwise, the signature would be 
removed. 
These challenges tested our abilities to maintain due diligence to retrieve correct results 
in determining IoT attack vectors. For malware analysis using YARA, we started with a 
database of 436 Yara signatures, of which 58% of signatures were automatically generated 
and 42% of signatures were manually written. After this filtering and refining process, the 
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final count of Yara Signatures was 209, of which 85% of signatures were automatically 
generated and 15% of signatures were manually written.  
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
The results of section 4.1 are retrieved from the plotting of ELF section metadata 
as described in section 3.3. Our malware samples were gathered from VirusTotal and 
correspond to binaries found in IoT devices that triggered positive AV detections. Using 
the malware corpus and tagging results from section 3.1, we are analyzing and plotting size 
and entropy metadata of binaries, “tagged” or otherwise.  
The results of section 4.2 are gathered from the static binary analysis methodology 
described in section 3.1. In the static analysis, we are using Yara and our database of 209 
valid signatures to tag a binary to a specific publicly disclosed vulnerability.  
4.1 ELF Header Analysis 
Figure 1 shows the CDFs of the number of sections per binary file in the “hit” group 
(plotted in red) and the “all” group (plotted in green). 
Figure 2 is side-by-side comparisons of size and entropy CDFs for random ELF 
sections. The green plots on each graph represent the CDFs of “all” binaries, while the red 






Figure 1: CDF Comparisons of the Number of ELF Sections 
 
Figure 2: CDF Comparisons of the ELF Section Metadata 
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4.2 Infection Analysis 
Table 1 presents the top 10 Yara signatures by tagged counts. When we ran all our 
signatures against our corpus of 42,327 binaries, we found that 55 of our 209 signatures 
(27%) garnered a positive result (a “hit”) and that 8410 binaries (20%) were able to have 
their infection vectors identified. 
Table 2 extends upon Table 1 and groups the signature hit counts into their 
respective attack vector groups. As we can see, the most common attack vector found was 
“Remote Code Execution,” comprising of 87% of all tags, followed by “Privilege 
Escalations” with 12% of all tags, and “Information Leaks” with 1% of all tags. 
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Vulnerability Vendor CVE Attack Vector Group # of Tags 
HuaweiHomeDeviceUpgrade Huawei CVE-2017-17215 Remote Code Execution 4573 
realtek_sdk_miniigd_upnp Realtek CVE-2014-8631 Remote Code Execution 2246 
f6xx_default_root ZTE  Privilege Escalation 1549 
gpon_bypass_injection Dasan CVE-2018-10562 Remote Code Execution 1220 
linksys_eseries_rce Linksys  Remote Code Execution 1146 
dlink_dsl_2750B_ci D-Link  Remote Code Execution 996 
CVE_2019_9082 ThinkPHP CVE-20190-9082 Remote Code Execution 600 
p660hn_t_v1_rce Zyxel CVE-2017-18368 Remote Code Execution 500 
hnap_rce D-Link  Remote Code Execution 471 
d1000_rce Zyxel CVE-2016-10372 Remote Code Execution 335 
Table 1: Top 10 Yara Signatures by Number of Times Tagged 
Attack Vector Group # of Yara Signatures # of Times Tagged 
Remote Code Execution 42 13720 
Privilege Escalation 7 1855 
Information Leak 6 191 
Table 2: Attack Vector Groups by Number of Times Tagged  
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
5.1 Findings and Recommendations 
Section 4.1 attempts to correlate ELF section metadata to malicious binaries. 
Figures 1 and 2 consist of samples of CDFs of ELF section metadata, displaying two plots 
per CDF corresponding to “hit” binaries and “all” binaries (per section 3.3). However, on 
closer examination, there is no distinguishable difference between the ELF section 
metadata CDFs of a “hit” binary and an “all” binary for all ELF sections. Thus, it can be 
demonstrated that we cannot correlate section metadata to malicious binaries. 
In observing the results of section 4.2, we can see that the most common attack 
vector was that of “Remote Code Execution,” or RCE, comprising 76% of hit YARA 
signatures (42/55) and tagging 13720 times (87% of all tags). The RCE attack vector 
involves exploiting improperly validated inputs (such as arguments in a GET or POST 
request) and crafting input to send to an IoT device in order to run a shell command. This 
can be very dangerous to an IoT device as a single shell command can remotely download 
and run dangerous code. 
 The second most common attack vector present was that of “Privilege Escalations,” 
comprising 13% of hit YARA signatures (7/55) and tagging 1855 times (12% of all tags). 
In the Privilege Escalation attack vector, an attacker attempts to either brute-force the 
username and password of the IoT device from a list of default accounts or attack an admit 
through targeted cross-site request forgery to login. Once an attacker logs in, they can run 
shell commands to further propagate malware or deploy payloads. 
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 The least common attack vector was that of “Information Leaks,” comprising 11% 
of hit YARA signatures (6/55) and tagging 191 times (1% of all tags.) In this attack vector, 
an attacker attempts to access specific web pages and configuration files as an unauthorized 
user to scrape information on admin login credentials and machine settings. Once admin 
credentials are found, an attacker logs in to the device and run shell commands as described 
above. This attack vector arose due to improperly set permissions for files that contain 
private information.    
5.2 Future Work 
 Future work in this research area will center on dynamic binary analysis and 
labeling behavior given summarized traces of a binary’s system calls. Our current work in 
dynamic binary analysis involves summarizing system calls at a high level of abstraction 
and building a chain of analysis to link specific system calls to different OS objects.  
 Future work in dynamic binary analysis will involve categorizing and labeling the 
behavior based on the system call summaries to verify the vulnerability by the malware to 
propagate. An extension to this work will be to employ machine learning to tag binary 
behavior automatically given system call summaries, instead of through manual analysis. 
The purpose of dynamic binary analysis and conducting behavior labeling is to observe 
network scanning and exploitation. By pairing dynamic binary analysis with static binary 
analysis, we can garner a holistic report on the activity of a binary and the currently applied 
methods used by malware to infect IoT devices. 
 Other areas of future work that can be taken extend upon the work performed on 
ELF section metadata analysis. An interesting observation that we encountered during this 
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process was the existence of a significant amount of “debug” ELF sections, comprising 18 
out of 52 sections analyzed (~35%). These sections appear in binaries as a result of 
improper compilation and are usually artifacts of toolkits. Future work in this area can look 
into the existence of specific sections with ELF binaries and determining a formative 






CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 In this work, we determine the attack vectors currently used by IoT malware to 
propagate between devices and spread throughout a network. We perform three main 
analyzes on a malware corpus of 42 thousand binaries to achieve this task: a static binary 
analysis comprised of Yara based pattern matching, a dynamic binary analysis based on 
summarizing system call traces, and an ELF section metadata analysis. Based on our work, 
we can determine that the most common attack vector currently used is the “remote code 
execution” vulnerability. This is followed by the “privilege escalation” attack vector, and 
finally by the “information leak” vector. Lastly, we proceed to graph ELF section metadata 
to find a pattern between section metadata and malicious binaries. However, this section 
of work does not produce any formative conclusions. Future studies could further extend 
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